Oxford Handbook of Criminology edited by Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner
-0001- pxxiii: David Garland: chapter on the development of criminology in Britain
-0002- p4: The first population census in Britain was conducted in 1801.
-0003- p4: Chevalier remarked of that period [after the 1830s] in France that there was ‘a determination to obtain figured for everything, to measure everything, to know everything, but to know it by numbers, [it was an] encyclopaedic hunger.
-0004- p5: The word ‘criminology’ was devised first in the 1850s and came into more general currency in the 1890s when it began to be taught in universities in Italy, Austria, Germany, and France.
-0005- p5: …criminology [came] to establish itself in Britain in the early 1920s…
-0006- pp6-: The 1970s were especially propitious: a survey conducted in 1986 revealed that nearly 60 per cent of the criminologists teaching in British universities had been appointed in that decade, and 30 per cent in the years between 1973 and 1976 alone (Rock 1988).
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CRIME
-0007- p7: The Oxford English Dictionary defined sociology as ‘the study of social organization and institutions and of collective behaviour and interaction, including the individual’s relationship to the group.
-0008- p7: Sociological theories of crimes are themselves correspondingly wide-reaching: they extend, for example, from an examination of the smallest detail of street encounters between adolescents and the police to comparative analyses of very large movements in nations’ aggregate rates of crime over centuries, and it is sometimes difficult to determine where their boundaries should be drawn. Two of the sociological criminologists most influential in the development of the discipline once defined it in the most catholic terms as ‘the body of knowledge regarding crime as a social phenomenon. It includes within its scope the processes of making laws, of breaking laws, and of reacting towards the breaking of laws’ (Sutherland and Cressey 1955:3).
-0009- p8: Crime, after all, is centrally bound up with the state’s attempts to impose its will through law… some, and control theoriests in particualr, would wish to be what David Matza once called ‘correctionalist,’ that is, to use knowledge about crime to suppress it. [PN: like Anders Breivik or the Virginia Tech shooter]
-0010- p9: At heart, many theories take it that crime is a consequence of defective social regulation. People are said to deviate because the disciplines and authority of society are so flaws that they offer few restrains or moral direction. The idea is a very old one, antedating the emergence of sociology itself, but its formal birth into theory is linked indissolubly with anomie and the French sociologist, Émile Durkheim.
-0011- p9: Durkheim awarded two rather different meanings to anomie, or normlessness. In The Division of Labour in Society, published in 1893, and in Suicide, published in 1897, he asserted that French Society was in uneasy transition from one state of solidarity or social integration to another. A society without an elaborate division of labour rested on what he called the mechanical solidarity of people who not only reacted much alike to problems, but also saw that everyone about them reacted alike to those problems, thereby lending objectivity, scale, unanimity, and solidity to moral response, and bringing a potential for massive disapproval and repression to bear down on the deviant. (Such a social order was conceived to lie in the simpler past of a less differentiated pre-industrial society.) The future of industrial society would be distinguished by a state of organic solidarity, the solidarity appropriate to a complex division of labour. People would then be allocated by merit and effort to very diverse positions, and they would not only recognize the legitimacy of the manner in which rewards were distributed, but also acknowledge the indispensability of what each did in his her work for the other and for the common good. Organic solidarity would thus have controls peculiar to itself: ‘Sheerly economic regulation is not enough…there should be moral regulation, moral rules which specify the rights and obligations of individuals in a give occupation in relation to those in other occupations’ (Giddens 1972: 11). People might no longer think wholly in unison, their moral response might not be substantial and undivided, but they should be able to compose their differences peaceably by means of a system of restitutive justice that made amends for losses suffered.
-0012- p9: …capitalism was thought to impose a ‘forced division of labour’, people acquiesced neither in the apportionment of rewards not in the moral authority of the economy or state. They were obliged to work and act in a society that not only enjoyed little legitimacy but also exercised an incomplete control over their desires. In such a setting, it was held, ‘man’s nature [was to be] eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, towards an indefinite goal’ (Durkheim 1952: 256). Moral regulation was relatively deficient and people were correspondingly free to deviate.
-0013- pp9-10: Given another, distinctively American, complexion by Robert Merton, anomie became a socially fostered state of discontent and deregulation that generated crime and deviance as part of the routine functioning of a society which promised much to everyone but actually denied them equal access to its attainment (Merton 1938). People might have been motivated to achieve success in the United States, the society on which Merton focused, but they confronted class, race, and other social differences, that manifest contradicted the myth of openness.
-0014- p10: In a society where failure was interpreted as a sign of personal rather than social weakness, where failure tended to lead to guilt rather than to political anger, the pressure to succeed could be so powerful that it impelled people thus disadvantaged to bypass legitimate careers and take to illegitimate careers instead: ‘the culture makes incompatible demands… In this setting, a cardinal American virtue– “ambition”–promotes a cardinal American vice– “deviant behavior” ‘ (Merton 1957: 145).
-0015- p10: Merton’s anomie theory was to be modified progressively for some thirty years. In the work of Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, for example, his model was elaborated to include illegitimate routes to success. Their Deliquency and Opportunity (1960) described the consequences of young American men…not only being pushed into crime by the difficulties of acquiring money and position in conventional ways, but also being pulled by the lure of lucrative and unconventional criminal careers. There would be those who were offered an unorthodox path in professional or organized crime, and they could become thieves, robbers, or racketeers. There would be those for whom no path was available, and they could become members of conflict gangs. And there were those who failed to attain admission to either a law-abiding or law-violating group, the ‘double failures’, who would it was conjectured, give up and become drug-users and hustlers.
-0016- pp10-1: In the work of Albert Cohen (1957), anomie was to be synthesized with the Freudian idea of ‘reaction formation’ in an attempt to explain the manifestly expressive and ‘non-rational’ nature of much delinquency. The prospect of failure was depicted as bringing about a major psychological rejection of what had formerly been sought, so that the once-aspiring working-class adolescent emphatically turned his back on the middle-class world that spurned him and adopted a style of behaviour that was its systematic inversion. The practical and utilitarian in middle-class life was transformed into non-utilitarian delinquency; respectability became malicious negativism; and the deferment of gratification became short-run hedonism. Again, in the work of David Downes, conducted in London in the early 1960s to explore how far beyond America anomie theory might be generalized, the ambitions of English adolescents were found to be so modulated by what was then a stable and legitimated system of social stratification that working-class youth did not seem to undergo a taxing guilt, shame, or frustration in their failure to accomplish middle-class goals. They neither hankered after the middle-class world not repudiated it. Rather, their response was ‘dissociation’. Where they did experience a strong dissatisfaction, however, was in their thwarted attempts to enjoy leisure, and their delinquencies were principally hedonistic, focused on drinking, fighting and malicious damage to property, rather than instrumentally turned towards the accumulation of wealth. And that theme—of the part played by the adolescent ‘manufacture of excitement’ and the courting of risk—was to be echoed repeatedly in the empirical and theoretical work of criminologists. Making ‘something happen’ in a world without significant cultural or material resources could eaily being about a drift into deliquency (see Matza 1964; Corrigan 1979; Cusson 1983; Katz 1988; Presdee 2000).
Anomie and Social Disorganization
-0017- p11: It is hard to live outside the reassuring structures of social life, and the condition of anomie was experienced as a ‘malady of infinite aspiration’ that was accompanied by ‘weariness’, ‘disillusionment’, ‘disturbance, agitation and discontent’. In extreme cases, Lukes observed, ‘this condition would lead a man to commit suicide and homicide’ (1967: 139).
-0018- p11: …sociologists are generally ill-disposed towards the term, believing that it connotes a want of understanding and perception on the part of the observer (see Anderson 1976; Katz 1997; and Whyte 1942).
-0019- p13: A second, large, and linked cluster of theories centres loosely around the contention that people seek to commit crime because it is profitable, useful, or enjoyable for them to do so, and that they will almost certainly break the law if they can.
-0020- p13: They profess to be interested less in the fidelity of description than in its yield for policy intervention and prediction in concrete situations. Theirs is a theory of practical rather than of empirical truths, and the practical is thought to suggest that more will be learned by exploring a few, uncomplicated factors that seem to prevent people from offending than by investigating all the complicated motives, meanings, and antecedents of their actions. Travis Hirschi put the issue baldly: ‘The question “Why do they do it?” is simply not the question the theory is designed to answer. The question is “Why don’t we do it?” ‘ (1969: 34)
-0021- p13: Earlier variants of control theory, compiled in the 1960s and 1970s, proceeded by drafting lists of the constraints which could check the would-be offender, an offender who, it was assumed for analytic purposes, could be much like you, me or anyone. Thus, arguing against subcultural theory, and grounded in a Freudian conception of human impulses that required taming, Hirschi claimed that ‘delinquent acts result when the individual’s bond to society is weak or broken’ (1969: 16).
-0022- pp13-4: Four chief elements were held by Hirschi to induce people to comply with rules: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Attachment reflected a person’s sensitivity to the opinions of others; commitment flowed from an investment of time, energy, and reputation in conformity; involvement stemeed from engrossment in conventional activity; and belief mirrored a person’s conviction that he or she should obey legal rules. There is tautology and repetition in that formulation, but he nevertheless usefully directed the criminological mind towards answering his one big question, ‘Why don’t we do it?’
Later, with Gottfredson, Hirschi developed control theory by turning to self-control and impulsivity. Crime, they claimed, flows from low self-control: it provides a direct and simple gratification of desires that is attractive to those who cannot or will not postpone pleasure. In the main, it requires little skill or planning. It can be intrinsically enjoyable because it involves the exercise of cunning, agility, deception, or power. It requires a lack of sympathy for the victim. But it does not provide medium or long-term benefits equivalent to those that can flow from more orthodox careers. In short, it is, they say, likely o be committed by those who are ‘impulsive, insensitive, physical… Risk-taking, short-sighted, non-verbal’ (1990: 90).
-0023- p14: What eases that process of disengagement are widely-circulating accounts or ‘techniques of neutralization’ (a massively influential idea that he had developed earlier with Gresham Sykes (Sykes and Matza 1957)) which enable people methodically to counter the guilt and offset the censure they might experience when offending. Matza claimed that delinquents could be fortified in their resolve by their ability to condemn their condemners (by asserting that police and judges were themselves corrupt and invalid critics, for instance); to deny injury (be asserting that no significant harm was done); to deny the victim (by asserting that the victim was of no consequence, or deserved what happened); or to appeal to higher loyalties (a noble motive could be cited for an ignoble deed).
-0024- p14: Steven Box attempted to take analysis yet further by reconciling Hirschi’s emphasis on social bonds with Matza’s conception of drift. He compiled his own new alliterative list of variables that were held to affect control: secrecy (the delinquent’s chances of concealment); skills (a mastery of knowledge and techniques needed for the deviant act); supply (access to appropriate equipment); social support (the endorsement offered by peers and others); and symbolic support (the endorsement offered by accounts available in the wider culture) (1971: 150). The greater the access to requisite skills, secrecy, supplies, and social and symbolic support, the greater would be the likelihood of offending.
-0025- pp14-5: Perhaps one of the most telling and economical contributions to control theory was supplied by Harriet Wilson. Examining ‘socially deprived’ families in Birmingham, England, she was to conclude that what most sharply differentiated families with delinquent children from those with none was simply what she called the exercise of ‘chaperonage’ (1980). Parents who acted as chaperons effectively prevented their children from offending…
-0026- p15: Control theory has also been applied with effect to the problem of gender differences in offending. Apart from age, no other demographic feature at present so powerfully discriminates between offenders and non-offenders.
-0027- p15: Feminist criminologists and others adopting a control perspective retorted that that was precisely what made women so important analytically, and they began to as Travis Hirschi’s central question about why women did not offend. There was the new and intriguing riddle of the conforming woman, and the riddle was answered, in part, by reference to the effects of differentials in control. John Hagan and his colleagues put it that deviation as a form of fun and excitement in public space was more commonly open to males than to females because daughters are more frequently risk-averse and more frequently subject to intense, continual and diffuse family control in the private, domestic sphere. That control, by extension, not only removed girls from the purview of agents of formal social control, the criminal justice system, and the possibility of public identification as criminal; it also worked more effectively because it rested on the manipulation of emotional sanctions rather than the imposition of physical or custodial controls. Shaming strategies and the withdrawal of affection are seemingly more potent than fines, probation, or prison. It followed that the more firmly structured and hierarchical the family, the sharper the distinction drawn between male and female roles, the more women were confined to private space, the greater would be the disparity between rates of males and female offending (see Hagen et al. 1979, 1985 and 1988). Pat Carlen gave that analysis yet another twist by reflecting that female criminals were most likely to emerge when domestic family controls were eroded or removed altogether, when what she called the ‘gender deal’ was broken, young women left home or were taken into the care of the state, and were thereby exposed to controls characteristically experienced by men (1988). The answer to the ‘crime’ problem’, Frances Heidensohn once concluded, would have to lie in the feminization of control.
-0028- p16: …involvement with the criminal justice systemand imprisonment may interrupt or undermine participation in stabilizing social environments; stigmatize the offender and prevent re-entry into the ‘straight’ world; encourage cynicism about criminal justice through a close acquaintance with its game-like and seedier features; and introduce the offender to other lawbreakers who help to amplify deviance through differential association. And, throughout, and following Matza, Katz, and others, Laub and Sampson party the process not as a grim and ineluctable progression into criminality, but as a sequence of events and actions which is influenced always by the capacity of people to interpret and choose how they will respond. The part played by human agency and contingency is repeatedly underscored, leading them to observe how impossible it is to predict future criminality from present circumstances.
-0029-pp16-7: In Ron Clarke’s particularly influential formulation, the rate of crime was held to vary in response to three broad configurations of factors. The first grouping revolved around increasing the effort Everyman would have to expend in committing a crime, and that entailed what was called ‘target hardening’ (by defending pbjects and people by shields and other devices); ‘access control’ (and that involved making it difficult for predators to approach targets); deflecting offenders (by encouraging them, for example, to act in a legitimate rather than an illegitimate manner through the provision of graffiti boards, litter bin, and spittoons); and ‘controlling facilitators’ (through gun control or checks on the sales of spray cans, for instance). The second revolved around increasing the ricks of offending through the screening of people (by means of border searches, for examples); formal surveillance by police, security guards, and others; surveillance by employees such as bus conductors, train guards, concierges, and janitors; and ‘natural surveillance’ (aided by lowering or removing obstacles such as hedges and shrubs around private dwellings, installing closed circuit television cameras, lighting the interiors of stores, and enhanced street lighting). The final grouping was ‘reducing the rewards of crime, itself composed of ‘target removal’ (using electronic transactions to reduce the number of cash payments, and thus the accumulation of cash in single places, for instance); property identification; removal of inducements (by the rapid cleaning of graffiti or repair of vandalized property); and rule-setting (through income tax returns, customs declarations, and the like) (taken from Clarke 1992: 13). A pursuit of those common-sense, sometimes indistinguishable, but nevertheless practical ideas allowed research officers at the Home Office in the 1970s and early 1980s to undertake a succession of illustrative studies, discovering, for example, that compact, old school building on small urban sites were a third as likely to be burgled as large, sprawling, modern buildings with their many points of access and weak possibilities of surveillance (see Hope 1982); or that there was some twenty times as much malicious damage on the upper than on the lower decks of ‘one man’, double-decker buses whose drivers’ powers of surveillance were confined to one level only (Mayhew et al. 1976: 26).
-0030- p18: The routine activities criminologist would argue that the analysis of predatory crime does not necessarily require weighty causes. Neither does it demand that the theorist commit the ‘like-causes-like’ fallacy which covertly insists that a ‘pathological’ phenomenon such as crime must be explained by a pathological condition such as alienation, poverty, family dysfunction, or class or racial oppression. Crime was taken to be inscribed in the very architecture of everyday life.
Crime, Control and Space
The Chicago School
-0031- p19: A number of the early Chicago sociologists united social ecology, the study of the patterns formed by groups living together in the same place, with the fieldwork methods of social anthropology, to explore the traditions, customs, and practices of the residents of natural areas.
Control and Space: Beyond the Chicago School
-0032- p20: …the reputations of natural areas themselves became a criminological issue; how was it, criminologists asked, that the moral meanings attached to space by residents and outsiders affected people’s reputations, choices and action? One’s very address could become a constraining moral fact that affected not only how one would be treated by others in and about the criminal justice system (see Damer 1974), but also how one would come to rate oneself as a potential deviant or conformist (see Gill 1977).
-0033- p20: Offending has its maps. Indeed, it appears to be densely concentrated, clustered around offenders’ homes, areas of work and recreation, and the pathways in between (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981-2).
-0034- p20: …dense, busy thoroughfares with their habitues have many more ‘eyes on the street’ and opportunities for witness reporting and bystander intervention, than sterile pedestrian zones, ‘confused’ mixed space or streets without stores and other lures (Jacobs 1965).
-0035- p21: ‘Defensible space’ itself leans on the psychological notion of ‘territoriality’, the sense of attachment and symbolic investment that people can acquire in space. Territoriality is held by some to be a human universal.
Crime, Power and Space
-0036- p22:Michel Foucault’s (1977) dramatic simile of Jeremy Bentham’s model prison, the Panopticon, was to be put to massive use in criminology. Just as the Panopticon, or inspection house, was supposed to have permitted the unobserved observation of many inmates around the bright, illuminated rim of a circular prison by the few guards in its obscured centre, just as the uncertainty of unobserved observation worked to make the controlled control themselves, so, Foucault and those who followed him wished to argue, modern society us soming to exemplify the perfection of the automatic exercise of power through generalized surveillance. The carceral society was a machine in which everyone was supposed to be caught (even, it seems, the police, who may survey one another as well as the wider population (see The Times, 4 November 1999): it relied on diffuse control through unseen monitoring and the individualization and ‘interiorization’ of control (Gordon 1972).
-0037- p22: …the introduction of CCTV appears to affect only the commission of motor thefts. All other forms of crime are untouched.
-0038- p23: Crime control was said to be an oppressive and mystifying process that worked through legislation, law-enforcement, and ideological stereotyping to preserve unequal class relations (Chambliss 1976; Box 1983).
-0039- pp23-4: Most mundane offending, it was argued, was actually less politically or socially consequential than other social evils such as alienation, exploitation, or racism (Scraton 1987). Much proletarian crime should actually be redefined as a form of redistributive class justice, or as a sign of the possessive individualism which resided in the core values of capitalist society. Criminal justice itself was engineered to create visible crowds of working-class and black scapegoats who could attract the public gaze from the more serious delicts of the rich and the more serious ills of capitalism that was usually said to be in terminal crisis. If the working class reacted in hostile fashion to the crime in their midst then they were, in effect, little more than the victims of a false consciousness which turned proletarian against proletarian, black against black, inflated the importance of petty problems, and concealed the true nature of bourgeois society. So construed, signification, the act of giving meaning, was either manipulative or misconceived, a matter of giving and receiving incorrect and deformed interpretations of reality. Indeed, it was in the very nature of subordination in a capitalist society that most people must be politically unenlightened about crime, control and much else, and the task of the radical criminologist was to expose, denounce, and demystify.
-0040- p25: [Left Realism’s] project was to examine patterns of crime and control as they emerged out of what Young came to call the ‘square of crime,’ a field of forces dominated by the state, the victim, the offender, and the public.
-0041- p25: Left Realists joined the formerly disparaged ‘administrative criminologists’ working in and for the state to work on situationally based projects to prevent crime and the fear of crime (see Matthews and Young 1992). They designed new and confusing configurations of streets to make it more difficult for ‘kerb-crawlers’ to cruise in search of prostitutes. They explored the impact of improved street lighting on the fear of crime. They assisted in the rehabilitation of dilapidated housing estates. Were it not for their theoretical preambles, it was at times difficult to distinguish between the programmes of the Home Office or other state criminal justice ministries, on the one hand, and of Left Realism, on the other.
-0042- p26: Crime is held by Young to be no longer regarded as abnormal, the property of a pathological few who can be restored therapeutically to the security of a moral community at one with itself, but normal, the actions of a significant, obdurate minority of Others who are impatiently excluded and demonized in a world newly insecure, fractured, and preoccupied with problems of risk and danger.
-0043- pp26-7 Functionalism was a theory of social systems or wholes, developed at the beginning of the twentieth century within a social anthropology grown tired of speculative accounts of the origins and evolution of societies which lacked the written history to support them, and dedicated to what was seen to be the scientific pursuit of intellectual problems. It was argued that the business of a social science necessitated moving enquiry beyond the reach of common sense or lay knowledge to an examination of the unintended, objective consequences of action that were visible only to the trained eye.
There were three clear implications. First, what ordinary people thought they were doing could be very different from what they actually achieved. The functionalist was preoccupied only with what were thought to be objective outcomes, and people’s own accounts of action held little interest. Secondly, the functionalist looked at the impact made by institution upon institution, structure upon structure, in societies that were remarkable for their capacity to persist over time. Thirdly, those consequences, viewed as a totality, constituted a system in which, it was thought, not only did the parts affect one another and the whole, but also, the whole affected them in return.
-0044- p27: There have been very few dedicated functionalist criminologists (see Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 78). Functionalists tend to deal with the properties of whole systems rather than with empirical fragments.
-0045- p27: It was easy enough to contend that religion or education shaped social cohesion, but how much harder it would be to show that crime succeeded in doing so. After all, ‘everyone knew’ that crime undermined social structures. It followed that functionalists occasionally found it tempting to try to confound that lay knowledge by showing that, to the contrary, the seemingly recalcitrant case of crime could be shown scientifically to contribute to the working of the social system. From time to time, therefore, they wrote about crime to demonstrate the potency of their theory. Only one functionalist, its grand master, Talcott Parsons, ever made the obvious, and therefore intellectually unsatisfying, point that crime could be what was called ‘dysfunctional’ or injurious to the social system are it was then constituted (Parsons 1951).
-0046- p27: The outcome was a somewhat heterogeneous collection of papers documenting the multiple functions of deviance: Kingsley David showed that prostitution bolstered monogamy by providing an unemotional, impersonal, and unthreatening release for the sexual energy of the promiscuous married male (Davis 1937) (Mary McIntosh once wondered what the promiscuous married female was supposed to do about her sexual energy); Ned Polsky made much the same claim for pornography (Polsky 1967); Daniel Bell showed that racketeering provided ‘queer ladders of success’ and political and social stability in the New York dockside (1960); Emile Durkheim (1964) and George Herbert Mead (1918) contended that the formal rituals of trial and punishment enhanced social solidarity and consolidated moral boundaries; and, more complexly, Mary Douglas (1966), Kai Erikson (1966), Robert Scott (1972), and others argued that deviance offered social systems a dialectical or educational tool for the clarification and management of threats, ambiguities, and anomalies in classification systems.
-0047- pp28-9: There has been an enduring strain of analysis, linked most particularly to symbolic interactionism and phenomenology, which insists that people do not, and cannot, respond immediately, uncritically, and passively to the world ‘as it is’. Rather they necessarily respond to their ideas of the world, and the business of sociology is to capture, understand, and reproduce those ideas; examine their interaction with one another; and analyse the processes and structures that generated them. Sociology becomes the study of people, relations, and practices as symbolic and symbolizing processes.
-0048- p29: Language is held to objectify, stabilize, and extend meaning. Used conversationally in the anticipation of an act, it permits people to be both their own subject and object, speaker and thing spoken about, ‘I’ and ‘me’, opening up the mind to reflective action. Conferring names, it enables people to impart moral and social meanings to their own and others’ motives, intentions, and identities. It will matter a great deal if someone is defined as eccentric, erratic, or mad; a drinker, a drunk, or an alcoholic; a lovelorn admirer or a stalker; a freedom fighter or a terrorist. Consequences will flow from naming, consequences that affect not only how one regards oneself and one’s position in the world, but also how one may be treated by others. Naming can create a self.
-0049- p30: What punctuates such a career is acts of naming, the deployment of language to confer and fix the meanings of behaviour, and symbolic interactionism and phenomenology became known within criminology as ‘labelling theory’. One of the most frequently cited of all passages in sociological criminology was Becker’s dictum that ‘deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by tohers of rules and sanctions to an “offender”. The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label’.
-0050- p30: In such meetings, criminals and deviants are obliged to confront not only their own and others’ possibly defensive, fleeting, and insubstantial reactions to what they have done, their ‘primary deviation’, but also contend publicly with the formal reactions of others, and their deviation can then become a response to responses, ‘secondary deviation’: ‘When a person begins to employ his deviant behaviour or a role based upon it as a means of defense, attack, or adjustment to the overt and covert problems created by the consequent societal reaction to him, his deviation is secondary.’
-0051- pp30-1: What is significant is that secondary deviation may also entail confrontations with new obstacles that foreclose future choice. Thus, Gary Marx listed a number of the ironic consequences that can flow from forms of covert social control such as undercover policing and the work of agents provocateurs: they include generating a market for illegal goods; the provision of motives and meanings for illegal action; entrapping people in offences they might not otherwise have committed; the supply of false or misleading records; retaliatory action against informers, and the like. Once a person is publicly identified as a deviant, moreover, it becomes difficult for him or her to slip back into the conventional world, and measures are taken with increasing frequency to enlarge the visibility of the rule-breaker.
-0052- p31: Borrowing its ideas from Durkheim and labelling theory and its procedures from a number of forms of dispute resolution, but from Maori and Japanese practice in particualr, shaming is for Braithwaite at its most effective when it is practised by those whose opinions matter to the deviant—his or her ‘significant others’; and that it would work only to exclude and estrange the deviant unless it was accompanied by rituals of reparation and restoration, effected, perhaps, by the tendering and acceptance of a public apology. Reintegrative shaming is currently one of the ‘big ideas’ underpinning the ideas (if not always the practice) of criminal justice policy across the Western world, but also in South Africa and elsewhere, where it is seen to be a return to the procedures of adoriginl justice. And it sits remarkably well with an interesting study of reoffending after prison that argues that the critical variable in desistance from crime is the capacity of a former inmate to construct a new narrative about his or her life which frames a new self now going ‘straight’.
Culture and Subculture
-0053- p31: Subcultures themselves are taken to the exaggerations, accentuations, or editings of cultural themes prevalent in the wider society. Any social group which has permanence, a common pursuit, and, perhaps, common problems is likely to engender, inherit, or modify a subculture; but the criminologist’s particular interest is in those subcultures that condone, promote, or otherwise make possible the commission of delinquent acts. A subculture was not conceived to be utterly distinct from the beliefs held by people at large.
-0054- p32: Albert Cohen, the man who invented the phrase ‘delinquent subculture’
-0055- pp32-3: Indeed, interestingly, there are currently strong signs of a rapprochement between critical cultural studies, symbolic interactionism and radical criminology, that has led to the creation of a new theoretical hybrid, cultural criminology, which emphasizes how transgression attains meaning in what is called a fluid, pluralistic, contested, hedonistic, ‘edgy’, and ‘media-saturated world’.
Criminology as an Eclectic Discipline
-0056- p33: Criminology is defined principally by its attachment to an empirical area: it is the study of crime that gives unity and order to the enterprise, not adherence to any particular theory or social science. It is in the examination of crime that psychologists, statisticians, lawyers, economists, social anthropologists, sociologists, social policy analysts, and psychiatrists meet and call themselves criminologists, and in that encounter, their attachments to the conventions and boundaries of their parent disciplines may weaken.
Prospects for the Future
-0057- p34: The half life of sociological theories is brief, often bound up with the duration of intellectual generations.
-0058- p35: At first or second hand, almost all the grand theorists have made something of a mark on criminology, but they, or their disciples, have rarely stayed long.
-0059- p35: Secondly, criminology will probably persist in challenging economics as a contender for the title of the dismal science. Criminologists are not professionally optimistic. A prolonged exposure to the pain of crime, rates of offending that (until fairly recently at least) had seemed prone inexorably to rise, frequent abuses of authority, misconceived policies, and ‘nothing’ or very little appearing to work, seems to have fostered a propensity amongst thinkers to infuse their writing with gloom and to argue, in effect, that all is really not for the best int eh best of all possible worlds. Stan Cohen once confessed that ‘most of us—consciously or not—probably hold a rather bleak view of social change. Things must be getting worse’. Prophecies of a criminological future will still be tinged at the margins with the iconography of Mad Max, Neuromancer, and Blade Runner.
-0060- p35: …policy-makers and politicians have a liking for argument phrased in numbers: it lends itself to an appearance of exactitude and control.
-0061- p35: …policies and politics have conspired to make certain kinds of applied reasoning, such as restorative justice and rational choice theory, the criminological anti-theory, particularly attractive to criminal justice agencies. Restorative justice is new, and modest in its reach, and it seems to ‘work’. Rational choice and control theories lay out a series of neat, inexpensive, small-scale, practicable, and non-controversial steps that may be taken to ‘do something’ about crime. Moreover, as theories that are tied to the apron strings of economics, they can borrow something of the powerful intellectual authority that economics wields in the social sciences.
-0062- p36: Criminological feminisms and feminist criminologies will undoubtedly sustain work on gender, control, and deviance and, increasingly, on masculinity. After all, if crime is laregly a male preserve, criminology must ask what it is about masculinity that seems to have such an affinity with offending. Connell, not himself a criminologist, has sketched the possibilities of an answer in his writing on ‘hegemonic masculinity’–the overriding ideology of male power, wealth, and physical strength—that lends itself to exploit, risk-taking, and aggression. Messerschmidt, Bourgois, and Polk have pursued that model of masculine behaviour into criminology, Bourgois exploring the work done to maintain ‘respect’ by cocaine-dealing Latin Americans on the streets of New York, and Polk describing how the defence of masculine conceptions of honour and face can precipitate homicide.
Chapter Two: Criminological Psychology by Clive R. Hollin
-0063- p43: The current vogue in psychology in Britain is to use the term ‘forensic psychology’ when referring to any topic even remotely connected with crime. Blackburn has commented on this etymological inaccurary, noting of the word ‘forensic’ that ‘Its established English meaning is hence “pertaining to or used in courts of law”, and that is how it has been understood by the public in general and lawyers in particular’. Indeed, this sense of psychology applied to legal decision-making is the way in which forensic psychology is properly nunderstood elsewhere. It is difficult, however, to arrive at a straightforward term that accurately describes the application of psychological theory and research to antisocial conduct, criminal behaviour, and law. For many years The British Psychological Society (the professional body for psychologists in Britain) used the term ‘Criminological and Legal Psychology’ rather than ‘Forensic Psychology’ to describe this specialist area of psychological knowledge and practice.
-0064- p43: …the focus of this chapter is on criminological psychology: that is, the application of psychological theory and investigation to understanding (and attempting to change) criminal behaviour. It is important at the outset to emphasize the point that criminological psychology is concerned with the use of psychology to help explain criminal behaviour.
The Growth of Psychology
-0065- p44: Criminological psychology is a specialist branch of what might be called mainstream psychology, that is the assembly of knowledge and theory about human functioning. To understand the evolution of criminological psychology it is helpful to set this against the development of psychology as an academic discipline and a profession.
Psychology as an Academic Discipline
-0066- pp44-5: It is generally taken that the founding of the first psychological laboratory at Leipzig in 1879 by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) signalled the beginning of psychology as a scientific, experimental discipline. (Another school of thought gives that particular credit to William James (1842-1940) at Harvard.) After the 1870s, the spread of experimental psychology (with the attendant growth in sophisticated statistical techniques) to universities in Britain and the United States quickly followed. Thus, by the early 1900s, psychology had become an established academic discipline in its own right across the university system (Richards 1996). The empirical, scientific approach adopted by the early experimental psychologists was in marked contrast to the strong continental European style of psychology heavily influences by philosophy and intellectual analysis, as seen for example in psychoanalysis and Gestalt Psychology.
The subject matter of these two approaches (Anglo-American versus European) to psychology also differed markedly. Early British psychology, heavily influenced by the theories of Charles Darwin (1809-82) and by intellectual figures of the time such as Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911), looked primarily to the study of individual differences. The empirical search by psychologists for individual differences in psychological constructs, such as intelligence, incorporated biological as well as psychological variables.
Early American psychology, as seen most clearly in the writings of John B. Watson (1878-1958), eschewed the inner world and focused on overt behaviour as the proper subject matter for psychological investigation. Indeed, Watson’s 1913 paper, ‘Psychology as the Behaviourist Views’, it has been called a ‘manifesto paper’ (Richards 1996: 47) for the later development of behavioural psychology. Two trademarks of this emergent behavioural approach were an implicit assumption of the link between behaviour and biological structures; and a belief in the scientific legitimacy of the use of animals in experimental research. In both instances the influence of the major physiologists of the time, such as the Nobel Prizewinner Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936), is clearly discernible.